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Boulwareism and Good Faith Collective Bargain.hig 
The obligation to bargain collectively in good faith is imposed 
on both the employer and the representative of his employees by 
the National Labor Relations Act.1 Generally, some form of ask-
I. Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958) and § 8(3) of the NLRA, as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 10l(b)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) 
(1958), require the employer and the labor organization respectively to bargain 
collectively. To bargain collectively is defined by § S(d) of the NLRA, as amended 
Ly the Labor Management Relations Act § lOl(d), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d) (1958), as the duty to "meet •.. and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 
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and-bid bargaining is used to satisfy this statutory obligation.2 Since 
1947, however, the General Electric Company has developed and 
used a bargaining technique known as Boulwareism,3 which, on its 
face, seems capable of achieving the same results as the ask-and-bid 
method, but in a more efficient manner. Nevertheless, the National 
Labor Relations Board recently found Boulwareism to be in viola-
tion of the duty to bargain in good faith.4 
Although the facts leading to the Board decision relate specifically 
to the 1960 contract negotiations between GE and the International 
Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE), they are 
typical of the Boulware techniques. Since initiating its plan to im-
prove industrial relations, GE has continually employed a communi-
cations program designed to promote the company's image as a pro-
tector of employee interests.5 When formal contract negotiations 
began in 1960, JUE was permitted to present its contract demands 
and supporting arguments. GE discussed and criticized the union's 
position, but did not indicate, either in its communication program 
or at the bargaining table, the particulars of its own position, nor 
did it provide certain information requested by the union. Follow-
ing this initial discussion period, GE made a firm and final offer 
based on extensive year-round research into all relevant considera-
tions, including a consideration of the union's demands.6 Since this 
offer was stated to be the only one warranted by the facts, GE de-
clared that it would not compromise its position, 7 but professed a 
2. In ask-and-bid bargaining, the parties unveil their respective positions at the 
outset of negotiations. Thereafter, the parties engage in an economic tug-of-war, 
hoping to force concessions and to reach an agreement. 
3. The term "Boulwareism" refers to General Electric's entire approach to labor 
relations. Its basic premise is that scientific methods, rather than bargaining skill, 
should be used for attaining settlements. See generally Northrup, The Case for 
Boulwarism, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1963, p. 86. Note, "Boulwarism": Legality 
and Effect, 76 HARv. L. REv. 807 (1963). 
4. General Elec. Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1491 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 1964) (hereinafter 
cited as principal case]. 
5. The communications relevant to the principal case publicized GE's philosophy 
of collective bargaining, questioned the motives of James Carey, the union president 
and chief negotiator in 1960, and ultimately urged the employees to indicate their 
approval of the GE offer to the union representatives. 
6. The offer included a 3% general wage increase effective when an agreement 
was signed and another 4% increase effective April 2, 1962. Brief for Respondent, 
p. 69, principal case. An almost identical offer was made by GE's competitor, Westing• 
house, and accepted by the IUE. See IUE News, Oct. 24, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; Oct. 10, 
1960, p. 3, col. 1. 
7. According to the Boulware theory, a holding back of material for later con-
cessions would be inconsistent with GE's policy of voluntarily accommodating the 
interests of its employees. While this approach appears to be take-it-or-leave-it 
bargaining, see Selekman, Cynicism and Managerial Morality, Harv. Bus. Rev., 
Sept.-Oct. 1958, pp. 61, 64. GE's technique does not seem to differ materially in effect 
from those situations in which parties take extreme initial positions, planning to 
retreat later in what appear to be concessions or compromises. See generally Blum, 
Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality? Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1961, p. 63. 
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willingness to alter its bargaining offer if IUE could show a sufficient 
change of circumstances or new facts to warrant an alteration in 
the offer.8 The union called an unsuccessful strike,9 which failed in 
part because of GE's solicitations to the local unions and to the indi-
vidual employees, and ultimately GE's offer was accepted. IUE then 
filed a complaint with the Board alleging that GE's bargaining con-
stituted an unfair labor practice.10 The Trial Examiner found that 
the totality of GE's conduct, which included a number of challenged 
practices,11 indicated that GE was not bargaining in good faith. 
Particularly, the Trial Examiner disapproved GE's final-offer bar-
gaining table conduct. GE filed exceptions, but a majority of the 
Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Report.12 
Good faith collective bargaining has always been a difficult con-
cept to define. Although the congressional discussions preceding the 
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act reveal disagreement 
as to the meaning of the statutory requirement,13 the early decisions 
of the NLRB and the courts clearly indicated that a mere meeting 
and discussion was insufficient to satisfy the statutory obligation and 
that, in addition, an effort must be made actually to reach an agree-
8. In past contract negotiations between GE and the IUE, changes in GE's 
original offer always have occurred. For example, in 1953 GE modified its offer after 
General Motors acceded to union demands for a wage increase. See Northrup, supra 
note 3, at 91. In 1960, twenty-three changes were alleged to have been made. Brief 
for Respondent, pp. 69-72, principal case. However, the Board mentions only five 
such changes. Principal case, at 1494. See note 38 infra. 
9. At that time, there were apparently three major demands which prevented 
agreement: (1) the discontinuance of a cost of living escalator clause spaced at inter-
vals between wage increases at more than one year; (2) a union shop; and (3) 
supplemental unemployment benefits. Brief for Respondent, p. 63 and Brief for 
General Counsel, p. 229, principal case. 
10. Similar charges were made in 1954 and 1958 but were dismissed by the 
General Counsel. NLRB Cases Nos. 2-CA-3811 (1954) and 2-CA-8190 (1958). 
11. The charges specifically cited were: (1) GE's failure to furnish certain 
requested information to the Union during negotiations; (2) GE's attempts to deal 
separately with locals on matters properly the subject of national negotiations with 
the IUE, and its solicitations of locals to abandon or refrain from supporting the 
strike; (3) GE's pre-negotiation presentation of a personal accident insurance pro-
posal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; and (4) its overall approach to, and conduct of, 
bargaining. Principal case at 1499. 
12. Member Jenkins concurred, disagreeing with the condemnation of GE's 
approach to collective bargaining. Member Leedom agreed with the concurring 
opinion on this issue but dissented from the majority opinion. 
13. Senator Walsh declared, "When the employees have ••. selected their repre-
sentatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer 
and say, 'Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees.' 'What happens 
behind those doors is not inquired into ... .'' 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935). On the other 
hand, Senator ,vagner thought the bill required a party to match unacceptable 
proposals with counterproposals and to make every reasonable effort to reach an 
agreement. Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935). See generally Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 
71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1403-09 (1958); Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty To Bar-
gain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1065, 1084 (1941). 
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ment.14. By 1947, however, Congress had become dissatisfied with 
the tendency of these tribunals to control the bargaining table con-
duct of the parties by examining the reasonableness of an employer's 
proposal.15 Consequently, section S(d) of the NLRA was added by 
the Taft-Hartley amendments to provide that the obligation to 
bargain collectively requires neither agreement to a specific proposal 
nor the making of a concession.16 A second amendment expressly 
obliged labor unions to bargain collectively.17 Congressional debates 
disclose that one motive for this latter addition was to outlaw by 
statute the unions' practice of making a single take-it-or-leave-it 
offer.18 Thus, legislative history seems to indicate that Congress had 
two principal objectives in imposing the duty to bargain collectively 
on both the employer and the union: (I) the assurance of a joint 
effort aimed at reaching agreement, including the prevention of a 
closed-minded or take-it-or-leave-it attitude, and (2) the prevention 
of compelling concessions or agreement. 
However, since Congress did not specify what conduct of the 
parties at the bargaining table would satisfy the obligation to bargain 
in good faith nor what inferences should be dra,;\Til from conduct and 
statements away from the bargaining table, the courts have had to 
devise some enforceable standard. The basic test developed seems 
to be whether a party's total conduct indicates a sincere desire to 
reach agreement.19 If that desire cannot be found, then it is pre-
sumed that the party has, in effect, rejected the whole basis of col-
lective bargaining. The inference of bad faith may be dra,;\Til from 
a party's bargaining tactics or from his bargaining position,20 but 
this determination often is a difficult one. Although external be-
havior without specific declarations may or may not indicate a party's 
state of mind, it is clear nonetheless that good faith theoretically 
requires more than the offer of a proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it 
14. See, e.g., Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939), enforced, lIO F.2d 
632 (4th Cir. 1940); Globe Cotton Mills, 6 N.L.R.B. 461 (1938); Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 
N.L.R.B. IO (1937). 
15. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1947). 
16. Labor Management Relations Act § I0l(d), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d) (1958). See generally H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 15, at 19-21; H.R. CoNF. 
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 
Pt. I at 24 (1947). 
17. Labor Management Relations Act § IOl(b)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(3) (1958). 
18. See 93 CONG. REc. 4135 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ellender); id. at 4363 (remarks 
of Senator Pepper). See generally Note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 502 (1958). 
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed &: Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th 
Cir. 1943); Duro Fittings Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 377 (1958). See generally Cox, supra 
note 13, at 1416-21. 
20. See Duvin, The Duty To Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 
248, 256-65 (196~). 
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basis.21 However, it is also established law that at some point in 
traditional ask-and-bid bargaining negotiations can be forced to an 
impasse.22 Indications of bad faith have included the outright re-
jection of a union's proposals,23 intentional stalling of agreement by 
postponement,24 or sending a representative to the negotiations who 
is unauthorized to bind the employer.25 And bad faith has been 
found when a party refused to produce reasonable proof to substan-
tiate a claim of economic inability to raise wages,26 where a party 
insisted upon patently unreasonable terms,27 and where a party 
forced negotiations to an impasse upon a proposal concerning a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining.28 On the other hand, bargaining 
table threats of economic harassment were held not to be inconsistent 
with good faith bargaining by the United States Supreme Court in 
NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union.29 
In certain cases, the Board and the courts have disregarded the 
good faith criterion and have found a per se refusal to bargain,30 
especially in matters involving conduct required by the NLRA itself. 
Thus, it is unfair labor practice per se to refuse to bargain on manda-
tory subjects,31 to change employment benefits unilaterally while 
negotiating with the union prior to an impasse,32 to refuse to execute 
a written contract incorporating any agreement already reached,33 
21. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' lnt'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960); 
NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1939). 
22. See NLRB v. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir. 1954); Texas 
Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1954); Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 
140 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1104 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1369 (1961). 
Cf. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952). 
23. E.g., NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953), enforcing 
as modified 100 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1952); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 8: Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 
84 (1956). 
24. E.g., NLRB v. Reed 8: Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 
U.S. 887 (1953). 
25. E.g., NLRB v. Hibbard, 273 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1960); Wheatland Elcc. Co-op. 
v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1953). 
26. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. U9 (1956). 
27. E.g., NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 
1963) (employer presented only two counterproposals, would not agree to put into 
writing provisions he was already observing, and demanded unilateral control of 
all conditions of employment in a management prerogatives clause); Majure v. 
NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952) (employer insisted on a management pre-
rogatives clause, reserving to himself unilateral control of all conditions of employ-
ment). 
28. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
29. 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
30. The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), gave full 
recognition to the per se doctrine. 
31. Ibid. Mandatory subjects are those concerning "wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment," using the terminology which appears in § 8(d) of 
the NLRA. See also NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Fleming, 
The Obligation To Bargain in Good Faith, 16 Sw. L.J. 43, 45.53 (1962). 
32. E.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); NLRB v. Shannon, 
208 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1953). 
33. E.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); NLRB v. Wate, Inc., 310 
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and to refuse to comply with reasonable requests to furnish informa-
tion. 34 Since these items are generally procedural in nature, the per se 
determination has been justified on the basis that compliance will 
facilitate the reaching of an effective bargaining agreement.85 
Applying these somewhat ambiguous standards to the principal 
case, it appears that GE's refusal to furnish certain requested infor-
mation alone might have been the basis for finding a per se refusal 
to bargain. Clearly, however, the NLRB grounded its holding on 
the breach by GE of some type of good faith test,36 specifically con-
demning GE's firm offer because it was similar to take-it-or-leave-it 
bargaining.87 But, since GE expressly stated an intention to accept, 
and indeed did accept, some changes,38 Boulwareism does not seem 
to involve an absolute take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Furthermore, 
there was substantial evidence to indicate that the offer itself was 
reasonable in all respects and that the company did desire to reach 
an agreement with the union.39 Thus, GE seems to have met the 
general test for bargaining in good faith. Moreover, conduct indi-
cating a purpose to insist on the acceptance of an offer without sub-
stantial alteration has been held not to constitute a violation of the 
duty to bargain if a sound business purpose underlies the employer's 
position,40 and arguably such a business purpose existed in the prin-
cipal case. However, in cases upholding such steadfast bargaining 
the absence of other conduct indicating bad faith has been critical 
to the court's approval, and in cases where conduct indicating a possi-
ble lack of good faith has existed, intransigence has been an impor-
tant factor in the court's finding of a departure from the good faith 
F.2d 700 (6th Cir 1962), enforcing 132 N.L.R.B. 1338 (1961); Standard Oil Co., 137 
N.L.R.B. 690 (1962). 
34. See NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 834 (1963); Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592 (1949). 
35. See generally Duvin, supra note 20, at 268-69. 
36. See principal case, passim. 
37. Id. at 1499. 
38. The five changes recognized by the Board were: first, an option of a 3% 
increase in wages in 1962, coupled with a fourth week of vacation for employees of 
twenty-five years service plus an eighth paid holiday for all employees, replacing 
the 4% wage increase contained in the original offer; second, the effective date of 
the 1960 wage increase was moved up to Monday of the week an agreement was 
signed; and the other three changes concerned the Company's employees' insurance 
and pension plans. Principal case at 1494. 
39. GE met with the Union forty-five times between July 19 and October 22, 
which was the date of the end of the strike. It conferred on all required subjects of 
bargaining, did not take unilateral action or insist to a point of impasse on any 
non-mandatory bargaining provisions. Its offer was not patently unreasonable, and 
the General Counsel conceded GE's desire to reach an agreement with the union. 
Brief for Respondent, p. 5, principal case. 
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1954), denying 
enforcement of 102 N.L.R.B. 1569 (1953); Texas Foundries Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 
791 (5th Cir. 1954), denying enforcement of 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952); McCulloch 
Corp., 132 N,L.R,.B, 201 (1961}, 
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standard.n It would seem, then, that the Tesult in the principal case 
could have been justified on the Board's determination that there was 
evidence of other conduct which indicated a lack of good faith.42 
One consequence of accepting this analysis would be that GE or 
another company could eliminate the condemned conduct from its 
bargaining procedure, and the remaining characteristics of Boul-
wareism would then be available as a good faith technique. How-
ever, the majority opinion of the Board seems to transcend even the 
flexible standard of the traditional good faith requirement and 
to condemn Boulwareism totally. 
The Board first condemned Boulwareism because of its tendency 
to disparage the union. The National Labor Relations Act gives 
employees the right to choose their own bargaining representative,43 
and the employer is required to recognize a certified union.44 GE 
apparently attempted to bypass IUE and to bargain directly with 
local unions when IUE was, in fact, the proper bargaining repre-
sentative. 45 Furthermore, one of the declared purposes of the NLRA 
was to restore equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees,46 and this required employees to focus concerted power 
through their chosen union organization and to use that organization 
as a vital and necessary instrument to force concessions from the 
employer. However, Boulwareism was calculated to suggest to em-
ployees that the union can procure no benefits for them that the 
company has not chosen to grant voluntarily. Although a history of 
tough bargaining alone might produce a similar impression, GE's 
technique of freezing its position through policy declarations means 
that even if it desires to compromise in a given situation, it cannot 
do so without risking loss of face.47 Thus, Boulwareism seems to 
relegate the employees' proper bargaining representative to a mere 
advisory position. 
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. 
Denton, 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1369-
70 (1961) (dictum). 
42. See evidence outlined note 11 supra. The Board's reliance upon GE's com-
munication program as evidence of bad faith should be carefully limited. Section 8(c) 
of the NLRA provides that communication cannot be evidence of an unfair labor 
practice unless it contains a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 61 Stat. 
142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958). Cases involving the interrelationship of §§ 8(a)(5) 
and 8(c) have upheld employer communications similar to those employed in the 
principal case. See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), 
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196 (1962). 
43. NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). 
44. See NLRA § 9(a), 49 StaL 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) and NLRA § 8(a)(5), 49 
Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). 
45. See principal case, at 1497. 
46. NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). 
47. At one point in the negotiations, GE admitted that "everything we think we 
should do is in the proposal and we told our employees that, and we would look 
ridiculous if we changed now." Principal case at 1500. 
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The Board also indicated that General Electric's technique vio-
lated the whole spirit of collective bargaining.48 In incorporating 
the terms "meet" and "confer" into the collective bargaining pro-
cess through section S(d), Congress arguably contemplated an atmos-
phere of reasoned negotiation that would result in mutual agree-
ment,49 whereas GE's approach requires that, if the company has 
done its research properly, there will be no need to change its offer, 
barring unforeseen circumstances.50 Although the substantive con-
tent of an agreement reached through Boulware techniques may be 
indistinguishable from one reached through a more or less intensive 
period of give-and-take discussion, there is no guarantee that this 
will be the result. If this difference is important, then it may also 
explain in part the Board's desire to force the resumption of tradi-
tional ask-and-bid bargaining. 
Although Boulwareism does seem to conflict with the traditional 
notions of collective bargaining under the statute, the Board should 
be criticized for failing clearly to indicate the reasons, apart from 
tradition, why it should not be recognized as an effective means of 
satisfying the obligation to bargain collectively. Since section S(d) 
expressly does not compel concessions, it seems unwise to discourage 
reasonable firm and final offers which are based on a full considera-
tion of all relevant facts from both the business and employee view-
points. Furthermore, when the employees themselves favor the com-
pany offer,51 it seems purposeless to require traditional ask-and-bid 
bargaining on the theory that employee interests will thereby receive 
greater protection. It is true that permitting a Boulware type offer 
might necessitate a determination of the reasonableness of the terms 
of the offer, an examination which Congress expressly tried to elimi-
nate by providing that concessions need not be made by either 
party.52 Nevertheless, it would seem that the Board and the courts 
are presently considering the reasonableness of the terms of an offer 
in cases where negotiations have been forced to the point of impasse 
and particularly where the parties have otherwise acted in good 
faith. 53 As a means of trying to encourage industrial stability through 
the recognition of bargaining maturity, perhaps a test more con-
sonant with all relevant considerations would require one party to 
give the other a reasonable length of time to examine a contemplated 
offer in whole or in part, to express its views, and to suggest methods 
48. Ibid. 
49. See generally Duvin, supra note 20, at 265. 
50. See principal case at 1500. 
51. In the principal case, the Schenectady local, the largest in the IUE, although 
striking for a short period, returned to work before the end of the 1960 walkout. De• 
certification petitions were filed by union employees in Bucyrus, Ohio, and Burlington, 
Vermont, and threatened elsewhere. See Northrup, supra note 3, at 92. 
52. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1947). 
53. See, e.g., cases cited note 22 supra. 
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of compromise before the offeror is permitted to declare a final Boul-
ware type offer. 
Since there was sufficient evidence in the principal case to enable 
the NLRB to conclude that the company's conduct did not coincide 
with traditional definitions of good faith bargaining between an em-
ployer and a union, it would seem that the Board has prematurely, 
and perhaps unfairly, condemned Boulwareism itself. Boulwareism, 
as an abstract bargaining concept, appears to have a potential for 
increasing the chances of early agreement and thus decreasing indus-
trial strife. For this reason alone, it merits a more thorough con-
sideration. If that part of GE's conduct which indicated a lack of good 
faith were eliminated and the disparagement of union power were re-
duced, it would appear that the other Boulware techniques, such as 
the reasonable firm and final offer and the major portion of the 
communications campaign, could lawfully be retained. The princi-
pal case will be examined by another court, 54 and perhaps by the 
Supreme Court, and a more specific indication of which character-
istics of the Boulware technique violate the National Labor Relations 
Act is required. The Board's seemingly innate adverse reaction should 
be insufficient to support the total condemnation of Boulwareism as 
an unfair labor practice. 
54. When the Board issued its order against General Electric, the company filed a 
petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the union 
filed a similar petition with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. When 
it was discovered that these review petitions had been filed at approximately the same 
time, the NLRB broke the impasse by seeking enforcement of its order with the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the territory in which the alleged unfair labor 
practices occurred. The other two courts have apparently agreed to surrender their 
jurisdiction to the Second Circuit. CCH LAB. L. REPORTS, p. I (Feb. 18, 1965). 
